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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL LYNN ADAMSON, : 
Petitioner and Appellee, : Appellate Case No. 990931CA 
vs. : Trial Court No. 924701125 
TED JAY ADAMSON, : 
Priority No. 15 
Respondent and Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§ 78-21-3(2)(h). The order appealed from is a final order disposing of all claims of 
all parties. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court properly grant summary judgment upon findings and 
conclusions of the bar of Appellant's claim by the law relating to res judicata. 
2. Did the failure of the Appellant to object to or appeal from the original 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QUADRO") and the Amended QUADRO 
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preclude the consideration of Appellant's petition for modification of the decree of 
divorce and the QUADRO. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
This Court reviews a trial court's modification determination for an abuse of 
discretion. See Hill v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722, 724 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). When 
questions of law regarding what constitutes a substantial change of circumstances 
are involved, the decision is reviewed for correctness. £e_e State v. Leyva. 951 P.2d 
738, 741 (Utah 1997). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES IN TRIAL COURT 
There is nothing in the record which shows that Appellant preserved the 
issue modifying the QUADROS. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Rule 4, Utah-Rules of Appellant Procedure provides that in a case in which 
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, 
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the case: 
The Appellant's Petition For Modification of Decree of Divorce was denied 
2 
by summary judgment of the trial court. 
2. Course of proceedings: 
Carol Lynn Adamson ("Carol") filed a Complaint for Divorce July 15, 1992, 
from Ted Jay Adamson ("Ted") (R 1). The parties entered into a Stipulation And 
Agreement filed November 3,1992, providing alimony for Carol and distributing 
one-half of Ted's retirement pursuant to Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393 
(Utah 1985). A Judgment And Decree of Divorce was entered November 3,1992 
awarding Carol one-half of Ted's retirement benefits pursuant to Woodward (R 
19). Ted engaged Attorney Clark R. Ward to file a Petition for Modification of 
Decree of Divorce dated July 9, 1996, requesting termination of alimony and 
striking from the divorce decree the provision awarding Carol the one-half of Ted's 
retirement, and alleging grounds for modification that on May 1,1995, Ted was 
permanently injured during his course of employment. (R 23-25). No action was 
taken upon the petition filed July 9, 1996. On January 15, 1998, a QUADRO was 
filed qualifying Carol for her share of benefits in a Utah pension fund and a national 
pension fund ( R 26-69). On January 29, 1998, Ted filed another Petition For 
Modification of Decree of Divorce by his present counsel re-alleging as grounds the 
disabling injury of May 1,1995 (R 31-33). Ted's affidavit in support of his second 
petition alleges that both parties have remarried, and that in February 1996, Ted 
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began drawing on his pension funds ( R 37). On January 29, 1998, Ted filed an 
Objection To Qualified Domestic Relations Order (R 41). Carol filed a 
memorandum opposing Ted's motion for temporary relief on February 9, 1988 (R 
48-50). The court ordered that for four months Ted could continue to receive the 
pension funds, which order was entered March 19, 1998 (R 55). Carol was 
notified that the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund required an 
Amendment to the QUADRO because of Ted's early retirement. Carol filed a 
Motion to Amend the QUADRO Conforming To the Plan's Requirements, dated 
May 19,1998 (R 57). The Amended QUADRO was filed June 2,1998 (R 59-63). 
No objection to the Amended QUADRO was filed by Ted nor was any appeal 
taken therefrom. Carol filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 19,1999, 
supported by a supplemental memorandum (R 78-81). Ted filed an opposing 
memorandum on June 1, 1999. Oral argument was held on August 24, 1999 ( R 
92). 
3. Disposition in the lower court. 
The trial court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and entered a 
summary judgment denying Ted's motion to modify the decree on September 27, 
1999 (R 93-97). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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Most of the relevant statement of facts are contained in the Statement of the 
Case supra. 
No alimony was awarded Ted in the Decree of Divorce, and Ted remarried 
on December 1, 1992, shortly after the Decree of Divorce was entered on 
November 30,1992. Ted's wife operates a pet salon and Ted works with her in the 
business. Ted was drawing on the pension funds in February 1996, before either 
QUADRO was filed and no appeal was taken from either the QUADRO or the 
Amended QUADRO. The Amended QUADRO (R 61) provides in paragraphs 6-
10 as follows: 
6. Paragraph 8 of the parties' Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
provides: "That Plaintiff be, and she is, hereby awarded one-half (1/2) of 
Defendant's retirement benefits pursuant to Woodward." The plaintiff as the 
Alternate Payee is hereby assigned a portion of the National Pension Fund 
benefit that the defendant, Participant, is currently receiving. The plan is to 
make payment of the Alternate Payee's benefit directly to her. 
7. Defendant began employment under the plans in 1975 and 
terminated in 1995. The divorce being granted November 30, 1992, the 
number of years in which the Defendant was employment under the plan 
during the marrage is 14 years. 
8. Plaintiffs interest in the Nation Pension Fund plan has been 
determined by the plan to be a portion of the defendant's benefit, calculated 
to be $195.42 per month during the lifetime of the defendant-participant. 
9. Plaintiffs interest in the Plan shall be payable to her, directly, now 
and in the future. 
10. The Alternate Payee shall receive her benefit as a share of each 
payment to which the Participant is entitled for his lifetime effective with the 
first day of the month after the month in which the Fund receives a court 
certified copy of this order. At his death, benefits to the Alternate Payee 
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under this order will cease. Should the Alternate Payee predecease the 
Participant, her portion of his benefit, as assigned in this order will revert 
back to him. 
Thus, Carol's entitlement terminates on Ted's death, and Ted's wife 
becomes the recipient. Also if Carol predeceases Ted, her entitlement terminates 
with her death. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both, the QUADRO and Amended QUADRO were entered more than one 
year after Ted commenced receiving payments under the pension plans by reason of 
his disability and early retirement. The Amended QUADRO recites that it was 
amended to conform to the requirements of the participants who have already 
retired (R 59). No appeal was taken from the Amended QUADRO. The court 
only retained jurisdiction in the original QUADRO to amend the order to establish 
or maintain the order's qualifications as a QUADRO under the Retirement Equity 
Act of 1984 (R 29). 
Pension funds are marital assets distributable as property and are not subject 
to modification unless associated with alimony, and then only rarely. The 
QUADRO as amended is res judicata. 
There is no distinction between entitlements based on early retirement and 
those available under full term retirement, both are entitlements under the same 
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plans. 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO MODIFY 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AS DIVISION OF MARITAL ASSETS. 
The law with respect to res judicata relating to property distribution in 
divorce cases is stated in 24 Am Jur. 2d 946, citing the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act Section 316(a): 
Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act the provisions of a 
divorce decree as to property disposition may not be revoked or 
modified unless the court finds the existence of conditions to justify 
the reopening of a judgment under the laws of this state. 
A clarification of the rules with respect to modification of a decree of divorce where 
installments on a property settlement agreement were intended as alimony, as 
distinguished from payments for an interest in property, where the former is subject 
to modification and the latter are not, is set forth in the following quotation of the 
opinion in Callister v. Callister. 1 Utah 2d 34,261 P.2d 944 (Utah 1953) at page 40: 
"This does not mean that payments under property settlement 
agreements may be modified even though incorporated into the decree. 
They may not. (Citing cases.) But in such a situation there is not the 
same underlying policy. The settlement of property rights should be 
final in order to secure stability of titles. Support allowances on the 
other hand should be subject to the discretion of the court as justice 
may require It has been loosely stated generally in passing that the 
divorce court has no jurisdiction to modify a decree based upon a 
property settlement agreement. (Citing cases, including Ettlinger v. 
Ettlinger, supra.) However, that does not mean that the court does not 
have jurisdiction on an application for modification to decide correctly 
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or incorrectly whether the decree is based upon a property settlement 
agreement, and is not subject to modification, or is based upon 
alimony or support allowance covenants, and is subject to 
modification." 
The Callister case is cited in Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980) in support 
of its statement: "Accordingly, the law limits the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court where a property settlement agreement has been incorporated into the 
decree." Id. At 1251. 
In the case of Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112 (Utah App. 1998), the divorced 
wife discovered 12 years after her divorce was finalized that a change in law 
permitted a divorced wife to share in a husband's military retirement. She claimed 
this to be a change in circumstances which would support a modification of the 
divorce decree. The Court of Appeals ruled that the matter was res judicata and 
there was no substantial change of circumstances. Id. at 115. The court quoted 
from Jacobsen v. Jacobsen. 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985), "In the absence of [a 
showing of substantial change in circumstances] the [divorce] decree shall not be 
modified and the matters previously litigated and incorporated therein cannot be 
collaterally attacked in face of the doctrine of res judicata." Id. at 305. 
The Jacobsen case was one in which the husband of the second divorced 
wife claimed that she promised to deed back real property to him once he settled 
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with his first wife. The decree in the second divorce was silent as to this promise, 
hence the second wife's challenge to the husband's petition to modify the decree 
was successful by reason of res judicata. 
While some cases have allowed modification of a decree of divorce where 
marital assets were related to payment of installments of alimony, there are no cases 
we have found which allow modification of provisions of a decree which divide 
marital assets, where the issues of alimony or support are not a concern. The 
Defendant, having remarried within a few days after the divorce was entered on 
November 30, 1992, the issue of alimony was permanently eliminated. Also, there 
was no provision for alimony for the Defendant in the decree. The Defendant's 
unfortunate accident causing his disability occurred May 1, 1995, some two and 
one-half years after his remarriage. If the Defendant is in need of additional 
support, the law imposes this duty upon his present wife with whom he is engaged 
in business. 
The QUADRO and the Amended QUADRO were entered more than a year 
after Ted commenced receiving disability payments. No appeal was taken from 
either QUADRO, and the court therein retained jurisdiction only to continue the 
QUADRO to qualify under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984. Therefore, the 
QUADRO itself excludes modification of the decree of divorce as to anything 
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associated with the plan. 
POINT II. APPELLANT WAS NOT AWARDED ALIMONY IN THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND WAS SOON REMARRIED WHICH 
EXCLUDES HIS CLAIM FOR ANY PROPERTY DIVISION BASED 
UPON CONSIDERATION OF GRANTING OR MODIFYING DECREES 
AS TO ALIMONY. 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(8) provides in part that "unless a decree of 
divorce provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse." 
Thus, even if Ted had been awarded alimony, it terminated upon his remarriage one 
day late later. 
POINT III. THE APPELLANT CITED UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §30-
3-5(3) REGARDING RETENTION OF JURISDICTION AS TO 
CUSTODY AND SUPPORT, INSTEAD OF §30-3-5(7)(g). 
Utah Code Annotated §30-3-5(7)(g)(i) provides: "The Court has continuing 
jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based 
on a substantial change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." 
Any such new order would conflict with §30-3-5(8) which automatically terminates 
alimony upon remarriage. Ted has been remarried since December 1, 1992. 
POINT IV. CORRECTION OF APPELLANT'S MISINTERPRETATION 
OF THE CASE OF WHITEHOUSE V. WHITEHOUSE. 
Appellant cites Whitehouse v. Whitehouse. 790 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 
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1990) on pages 7 and 8 of his brief as being in support of his claim for modification 
but he neglected to indicate that the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. In 
the Whitehouse case, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's modificiation 
of interests in real property and a retirement plan where the former husband's 
employment had decreased and the former wife's income had increased. The Court 
stated: 
The change necessary to justify a modification of a decree of divorce 
varies with the type of modification contemplated. Provisions dealing with 
alimony and child support are more susceptible to alternation at a later date 
because the needs that such provisions are intended to fulfill are subject to 
rapid and unpredictable change. £e§ e.g.. Foulger v. Foulger. 626 P.2d 412, 
414 (Utah 1981). Provisions relating to property, however, should be 
modified with great reluctance. Ia\ In the interest of promoting stability in 
titles, modifications in a decree of divorce affecting the "disposition of real 
property are to be granted only upon a showing of compelling reasons arising 
from a substantial and material change in circumstances." Id. (emphasis 
added). See also Williams v. Shearwood. 688 P.2d 475,476 (Utah 1984) 
(property divisions should be modified only with great reluctance and upon 
compelling reasons.) 
This applies a fortiori when, as in this case, a decree is based upon a 
property settlement agreement, negotiated by the parties and sanctioned by 
the court. Foulger. 626 P.2d at 414. In such cases, equity should not be used 
as a lever to realign rights and privileges "voluntarily contracted away simply 
because one has come to regret the bargain made." Lea v. Bowers. 658 P.2d 
1213, 1215 (Utah 1983) (quoting Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 
(Utah 1980)). 
Id. At 61. 
Thus far, we have found no Utah cases which supported a modification of a 
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Decree of Divorce as to property distribution which was granted pursuant to 
stipulation of the parties and none where a change of circumstances was the basis 
for modification of the property distribution. 
POINT V. THE RETIREMENT PLANS DO NOT DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN DISABILITY BENEFITS DUE UNDER NORMAL 
RETIREMENT. 
The Amended QUADRO (R 59-63) refers to Ted as the "participant" and to 
Carol as the "Alternate Payee" (R 61). The QUADRO recites that it is amended to 
conform to requirements where the participant has already retired. On page 3 (R 
61) it states that plaintiffs interest is determined to be "a portion of the defendant's 
benefit, calculated to be $195.42 per month during the lifetime of the defendant-
participant." 
Therefore, the plan itself has acknowledged the early retirement and a 
distribution to Carol under the same specific plan which provides for early 
retirement as well as normal retirement. The QUADRO also recites "The plaintiff 
as the Alternate Payee is hereby assigned a portion of the National Pension Fund 
benefit that the defendant, Participant, is currently receiving." (R 61^6). 
The pension plans required that the QUADRO be prepared to conform to the 
plans and policies of the respective entities. The court, in executing the QUADRO 
adopted, approved language of the Plans. The Plans assigned portions of the 
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benefits Ted was currently receiving to Carol, even though it specified in the last 
sentence of paragraph 1 (R 60) that "Defendant retired under the Disability 
Pension provision of the Plan effective April 1, 1996." Neither the Plan nor the 
court regarded the disability payments as affecting the entitlement of the Alternate 
Payee, Carol. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment denying the petition for 
modification of the decree of divorce. The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this J/_ day of July, 2000. 
Respectfully submitted. 
s 'George fC Fadel 
Attorney for Appellee. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that trie BRIEF OF APPELLEE was sent to Mr. Alan R. Stewart, 
Attorney at Law, 1366 East Murray-Holladay Road, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
this J, I day of , 2000. 
eorge K. Fadel 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 






| FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW DENYING 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
I Civil No. 9247001125 DA 
Judge Jon M. Memmott 
The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of 
divorce, came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District 
Judge, on Tuesday the 24th day of August, 1999. Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel. Defendant 
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R. Stewart. The Court 
having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the 
arguments of counsel, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. A divorce decree was entered in this cause on November 
30, 1992, pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, which 
decree states in part "That plaintiff be, and she is, hereby 
awarded one-half (1/2) of the Defendant's retirement benefits 
pursuant to Woodward," and as such, the retirement benefits are 
no different from other marital assets as to finality of 
1 
division. 
2. The defendant remarried on December 1, 1992. On May 1, 
1995, defendant was injured in a work-related accident and 
qualified for early retirement under a Utah Pipe Trades Pension 
Trust Findf and the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension 
Fund. 
3. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QUADRO) was 
entered on January 15f 1998, and was amended to conform to the 
national plan for early retirement cases on June 2, 1998. No 
appeal was taken by the defendant from either QUADRO. The 
defendant filed his petition for modification of the decree of 
divorce dated December 23f 1997, claiming that his disability 
entitled him to retain all of the pension fund monthly payments 
during his lifetime. The pension fund notified both parties and 
counsel that the plaintiff as alternate payee would be entitled 
to her proportionate share of the national fundf $195.42 per 
month during the lifetime of the defendant, and upon his death 
she would not be entitled to any other benefits therefrom. 
4. The award to plaintiff of one-half of the defendant's 
retirement bencjfits pursuant to Woodward was part of a 
distribution of marital assets and had no relationship to alimony 
or support. As in Woodward, this is a division of marital assets 
which is not dependent upon when the defendant began receiving 
retirement pay. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
2 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to entitlement 
of the parties in the retirement benefits of the defendant, and 
the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the QUADRO as 
amended, other than as stated in the amendment that the Court 
retains jurisdiction to amend the QUADRO as needed to establish 
or maintain the Order's qualifications under the Retirement 
Equity Act of 1984. 
2. Plaintiff is entitled to Summary Judgment denying the 
Defendant's Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce. 
3. No costs are awarded either party. 
Dated thispA- day of September, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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George K. Fadel #1027 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
170 West 400 South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 295-2421 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROL LYNN ADAMSON, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
TED JAY ADAMSON, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT DENYING | DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO MODIFY 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
| Civil No. 9247001125 DA 
i Judge Jon M. Memmott 
The hearing on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 
denying defendant's petition for modification of decree of 
divorcef came on before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, District 
Judgef on Tuesday the 24th day of Augustf 1999. Plaintiff 
appeared in person and by counsel, George K. Fadel. Defendant 
appeared in person and by counsel Alan R. Stewart. The Court 
having read the memoranda filed by the parties and hearing the 
arguments of counsel, and having heretofore made and entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf and it appearing that 
Summary Judgment should be entered pursuant to Rule 56f Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in that the pleadings, decree and other 
information contained in the record show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and the plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, now therefor: 
IT IS ORDEREDf ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
1 
~ vCi 
1. The QUADRO as amended is res judicata as to the 
entitlement of the parties to retirement benefits of the 
defendant, and the Court is without jurisdiction to modify the 
QUADRO as to the plaintiff's entitlement pursuant to the Decree 
of Divorce entered in this cause. 
2. Summary Judgment is hereby entered denying the 
defendant's motion to modify the decree of divorce. 
3. No costs are awarded either party. 
Dated this of September, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
